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COLLOQUIUM

Science and Public Policy: New Ambient
Air Quality Standards Under the
Clean Air Act
WILLIAM

I.
A.

F. PEDERSEN*

Introduction

The Legal Framework

Establishment of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) 1 is governed by Sections 1082 and 1093 of the
Clean Air Act (CAA). Except perhaps for the environmental
impact statement provisions of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),4 these have been the most written
about provisions in proportion to their length in all of environmental law. Because they were part of the original 1970
Clean Air Act, 5 they naturally attracted the attention of those
who wished to enter what was then a new field. We can attribute the NAAQS publications of a generation of academics in
part to the intellectual investments they made in the 1970s.
Of course, the NAAQS provisions also have extraordinary
*

Shaw, Pitman, Potts & Trowbridge, Washington, D.C. I would like to

express my appreciation to the University of Michigan Law School for the appointment as Visiting Professor during the 1997-98 academic year that allowed
me to write this article. This article was based on a conference presentation
given in January 1998. Since that date, the D.C. Circuit has invalidated the air
quality standards discussed in this article. See American Trucking Ass'n v.
EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) pet. for rehearingpending.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409-7410 (1970).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (1970).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1970).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1994).
5. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
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practical importance and some unique design features that
contribute to this continued interest. Two of those features
hold particular relevance for this conference. They are: 1) the
constricted range of factors that Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) considers in setting these standards;6 and 2)
the requirement that EPA receive formal, outside, scientific
7
advice before setting them.
B.

EPA's New Air Quality Standards

It was EPA's promulgation in July 1997 of much tighter
air quality standards for particulates and ozone that drew
new attention to the NAAQS provisions and made this conference particularly timely.8 According to EPA's hotly contested projection, the new particulate standard will prevent
hundreds, 9 or perhaps even thousands of deaths a year. 10
This benefit, if true, is almost off the upper end of the scale
for an environmental rule. By contrast, EPA admits that the
benefits of the ozone standard will be exceeded by its imple6. See Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1997, §§ 108(b)(2), 109(d)(2)(c), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7408(b)(2), 7409(d)(2)(C). Section 109(b)(1) of the CAA requires "primary"
air quality standards to "protect the public health" with an "adequate margin of
safety." See CAA § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). Section 109(b)(2) requires
"secondary" standards to "protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the
ambient air." See CAA § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2). Although other provisions of the NAAQS framework refer to the consideration of economic and
technical feasibility, it has long been EPA's position that because the passages
quoted do not refer to anything other than the impact of the pollutant itself on
health or welfare, only facts relating to that impact can be considered in setting
a NAAQS. See CAA §§ 108(b)(2), 109(d)(2)(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(b)(2),
7409(d)(2)(C).
7. See CAA §§ 108(b)(2), 109(d)(2)(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(b)(2),
7409(d)(2)(C).
8. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg.
38,856 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50); National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652 (1997) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 50); Revised Requirements for Designation of Reference and
Equivalent Methods for PM2.5 and Ambient Air Quality Surveillance for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,764 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 53 and
58).
9. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62
Fed. Reg. at 38,656.
10. 143 CONG. REC. H8291-2b (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1997) (statement of Carol
Browner).
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mentation costs. Although the exact magnitude of those implementation costs has been much debated for both sets of
standards, it seems reasonably clear that they will be the
most expensive NAAQS since the original 1971 promulgations. 1 1 And while the standards issued in that now far distant day took effect without legal challenge, I can tell you
from personal knowledge, as can most of the other speakers,
12
that there is absolutely no chance of the same result here.
Despite these health and cost stakes, the impact of these
new standards on the shape of the CAA's control strategies
may be their most important legacy. By EPA's own account, it
now seems clear that the pollutants these two NAAQS will
require to be regulated often travel hundreds or even
thousands of miles from their point of emission to their point
of impact. 13 Since the existing CAA does not really focus on
any region larger than a state,' 4 and largely restricts its effective NAAQS mandates to requiring states to adopt measures to attain the standards within their boundaries, 15 it is
badly suited to spur the multi-state approach that will be required to effectively control ozone and fine particulates. To
solve this problem, EPA has called for voluntary cooperation
between groups of upwind generator states and downwind recipient states to devise control plans.
11. EPA estimates the cost of achieving the ozone standard at $96 billion
per year. See EPA REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR PROPOSED OzoNE AMBiENT AIR QuALITY STANDARD at E9-12 (1997). EPA estimates the cost of achieving the particulate standard at. $37 billion per year, see EPA "Regulatory
Impact Analysis for Proposed Particulate Matter National Ambient Air Quality
Standard" at ES-13, 9-1 (1997).
12. Approximately fifty challenges each to the ozone NAAQS and particulate NAAQS were filed and consolidated together as American Trucking Assoc.
v. EPA, No. 97-1440, 1998 WL 65651 (D.C. Cir.). The cases were argued together on December 17, 1998 and decided in May 1999. My firm served as lead
counsel to the challengers in the particulate case.
13. The best discussion of these complexities is in an EPA document, "Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Implementation of New or Revised
Ozone and Particulate Matter (PM) National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) and Regional Haze Regulations." Implementation of New or Revised
Ozone and Particulate Matter (PM) National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) and Regional Haze Regulations. 61 Fed. Reg. 65,764 (1996).
14. See CAA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 7407.
15. See id.
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History counsels skepticism about the extent to which A
will voluntarily assume a burden for B's benefit, whether A is
a state or an individual. It is largely because of that unwillingness that we have law and government. Although the existing CAA gives EPA the formal power to compel interstate
cooperation, 16 such formal powers tend not to be used effectively, unless Congress sets them in a context of precise commands and implementing mechanisms to give them
credibility and reduce the transaction costs. The interstate
provisions of the Clean Air Act largely lack such a context.
Whether EPA has the will and the power to act effectively
without it over the next few years remains a very open
question.
Accordingly, EPA's current control approach seems likely
to fail even if the new NAAQS survive judicial and political
review. But if they survive, that very failure will become part
of the legislative agenda for the next revision of the CAA and
will furnish arguments for re-orienting the statute to a more
regional focus even in these basically conservative times. Indeed, only such a regional approach would be able to attain
the NAAQS that EPA has promulgated. Arguments for a
more national approach to air pollution control can be made
that are not based on the NAAQS. Regional air pollution contributes to degraded visibility in national parks and wilderness areas 1 7 and to water pollution in areas like the
Chesapeake Bay. However, these arguments are far less potent than an argument based on the need to protect public
health as codified in a NAAQS.
C.

Opinions on this Matrix

Very often, in environmental regulation, public opinion
of the sort that determines what can be done - or even seriously considered - is one thing, and academic opinion on what
should be done is another. The NAAQS provide a leading example of that phenomenon.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 7426.
17. See Regional Haze Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 41,138 (1997) (EPA's proposed "Regional Haze" rule).
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On the public opinion side, the "consider health only"
rule has become politically untouchable, as a series of industry and conservative proponents of legislative change have
discovered to their loss and sorrow over twenty years. Academics have heavily criticized that very same feature of the
NAAQS. Most obviously, they have labeled it a prescription
for cost-ineffective regulation, either in general or in particular geographic areas."' How can we define health as our absolute goal without considering what it will cost to get there?
Some academics have argued, for some of the same reasons,
that the restricted set of factors discourages informed public
debate by artificially making some clearly relevant factors inapplicable. Turning to what may be another side of the same
coin, others have contended that the command to "protect
public health" with an "adequate margin of safety" "represents the unhappy legacy of a bureaucratic past that too
readily delegated basic value choices to bureaucratic
experts." 19
II.
A.

Discussion

The Good Points of the "Health Only" Test
1.

At Least it is Health

As much as analysts and professors may disapprove, the
vast majority of legislative commands to protect the environment are just like the NAAQS, in that they restrict the regulatory agency to considering a limited set of factors.
Moreover, in the opinion of many observers, which I do not
necessarily share, those provisions that do allow the agency
to consider all the logically relevant factors before acting
have too often led to "paralysis by analysis" and inaction,
rather than balanced progress.
Against that background, the "health only" approach has
two major benefits. First, at least it points to environmentally relevant factors. That makes it different from the typical
18. See Krier, The IrrationalNational Air Quality Standards:Macro and
Micro Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. REV. 323 (1974).
19.

ACKERMAN

&
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environmental control provision, which simply calls on a defined set of sources to install the "best technology" to reduce
releases. 20 Often these provisions make the environmental
benefits of the technology expressly irrelevant to the control
decision. There is no reason to believe in advance that installing "best technology" measured under such a test on
some subset of our society's institutions will be too little, too
much, or just enough to solve environmental problems, much
less that it will pass any kind of cost/benefit test.2 1 In fact, we
have learned from our experience in imposing "best technology" on water discharges that a Best Available Technology
(BAT) approach tends to leave out those sources that are politically inconvenient to regulate and thus to fall short of any
coherent environmental goal. 22 Moreover, the focus on BAT
tends to draw both EPA and private resources into defining
the state of technology in a given industry (or a lot of industries) at a given point in time, rather than into deepening our
understanding of environmental problems.
Measured against this alternative, rather than against
the alternative of an unreal ideal cost/benefit approach, the
NAAQS provisions look a lot better. The standards for decision NAAQS prescribe focus on real environmental problems
for all their incompleteness. By giving health, and to a lesser
extent, welfare, the central role in the regulatory architecture, they make information about the health and welfare effects of pollutants central to justifying or questioning a
NAAQS. In that manner they draw both public and private
investment into improving our understanding of health and
welfare. That is a lot better than drawing them into improv20. See, e.g., Clean Air Act §§ 111(a)(1), 112(d)(2); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act § 304(b) (1996).
21. See CAA §§ 108, 109(d), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7409(d) (1994).
22. Congress and EPA have exempted such undeniably important sources
of water pollution as farms, dams, and return flows of irrigation water from
technological controls. See generally William F. Pedersen, Turning the Tide on
Water Quality, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69 (1988). Such small-scale sources are politically inconvenient to regulate because there are so many of them and their owners are politically vocal. See id. The fact that such sources are often also poorly
suited to "best technology" regulation provided another ground for selecting the
expedient course of granting them a virtually complete exemption from controls. See id.
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ing our understanding of technology. Since the influence of
air pollution on health and welfare is a permanent topic of
environmental concern, the NAAQS test keeps us focused on
the real issues.
Congress' requirement that all NAAQS be reviewed in
detail by an outside scientific advisory body multiplies the
benefits of this focus on a real issue. Providing for review by
an expert panel, not just by the courts, enforces a minimum
level of scientific competence and articulation from all participants in the process and thus reinforces the statutory focus
on the merits of health protection. Most of the advocacy in
setting NAAQS now takes place before the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC). Even though I argue below that the CASAC framework is too narrow, the debate
that does go on there is clearly a good thing.
To put it another way, it is a benefit, not a detriment, of
the legal framework for establishing NAAQS that twenty-five
years after NAAQS were first established we are still discussing the meaning of the London Fog Studies of the 1950s for
particulate control, 23 and the effect of ozone on plants. What
it says about our public investment priorities may be another
matter.
2.

A NAAQS Based Only on Health can Stimulate
Debate on Policy

It may be, I will suggest for the sake of argument, that
those academics who believe that to prohibit considering
costs in setting NAAQS is to stifle public debate have taken
too restricted a view of the matter. The use of a full cost/benefit analysis to establish NAAQS might well have led to livelier debates than we have now before EPA, but the discussion
would basically have ended there. Once the agency had balanced the factors and resolved the issues, its decision would
enjoy all the normal presumptions of validity in both legal
23. See EPA AIR QUALITY CiTEmA DocuMENT, EPA REP. No. EPA-60018029a, -029b, -029c, at 14-24 (1982).
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and political forums, which in turn would naturally diminish
24
both the heat and the light from any subsequent discussion.
The current approach, by contrast, may increase the focus on air quality policy among the larger public precisely because it presents to the public a lopsided decision that by its
ostensible refusal to consider any questions of practical implementation aggressively calls on the public for its own opinion of those questions. That would be clear if the NAAQS
were set in the same manner as at present, but lacked legal
effect. Under such an approach, the Federal government
would formally define "health protective" air quality levels
and leave attaining them purely to the states. 25 That in turn
would compel states to decide how much of an investment to
make based on the new information and analysis that the
NAAQS embodied. The basic impact of the NAAQS on public
debate really should not be markedly different under that approach than under our current system. The potential range
of reactions to the NAAQS is the same in each case, ranging
from an assertion that the health effects at issue are so trivial
or so costly to prevent that no additional public resources
should be devoted to preventing them, to an assertion that
society should accept preventing these effects as an absolute
command to be achieved by any means necessary. The two
approaches differ, not in the fundamental public policy issues
they raise, but the burden of effort toward attainment they
24. A broad cost/benefit balancing test might also increase the chances that
the agency would perpetually analyze the issues and never take action. However, that danger, if it is a danger, seems only marginally greater than the danger that the agency, under the existing approach, will perpetually analyze the
health issue. In both cases, the time-honored solution would be the same,
namely the imposition of a deadline for action that would be enforceable in turn
by citizen suit.
25. This is not at all an absurd idea in theory. There are clear economies of
scale in reviewing and assessing the science of air quality once, at the federal
level, rather than leaving each of the fifty states to cope with that task as best it
can. But why should the federal government dictate to the people of each state
the political choices they make on the basis of that information? Perhaps the
biggest practical advantage of the national approach is that it is better able to
handle interstate effects than a decentralized matrix. Specifically, a decentralized approach would have to decide how to react when a downwind state like
Vermont set very tight air quality standards and then called on upwind states
to take all steps necessary to meet it.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss1/2
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command. But if we are debating policy from the beginning,
the place on the spectrum of possible attainment efforts towards the NAAQS that Congress has currently elected in no
way prevents us from arguing that we should choose a different place in the future. In this perspective, the fact that the
currently chosen place is burdensome may actually spur
debate.
Has the inability of the Interior Department to consider
costs in listing endangered species led to more or less political, academic, or general public debate on endangered species policy than a rule that allowed a full cost-benefit
balancing?
3.

One-Sided Goals Can Also Stimulate Technological
and Social Change

Beyond encouraging public debate, let me suggest two
other related public advantages in setting a goal that does
not take much account of costs and practicalities. The first
concerns technology; the second, what, for want of a better
word, I call public opinion.
a.

Technological Change

Encouraging technological advances is only part, and
perhaps a diminishing part, of the solution to our environmental problems. To the extent that achieving our environmental goals does depend on the application of technology, a
cost/benefit approach to standard setting will reflect the government's estimate of what technology can now accomplish.
As a judgment of current technology, that estimate may be
either too pessimistic or too optimistic, perhaps depending on
whether the government believes industry cost estimates or
its own. It will, most likely, be too pessimistic a reflection of
what can be accomplished in the long run, meaning twenty
years or more. Our environmental statutes are beginning to
inch toward acknowledging the fact that adequately addressing our environmental problems will take, has taken, that

9
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much time. 2 6 Over such a long scale, there is much to be said
for establishing a goal toward which technology can strive,
even if we cannot yet see how it will get there.
b.

Social Change

Encouraging technical innovation by itself will not solve
our environmental problems. In fact, the focus on technical
change can provide an easy political out for those who wish to
advertise, to the public at large, the benefits of a clean environment while concealing its costs. By claiming that industrial innovation can solve our problems, the speaker
overlooks the inconvenient fact that in many cities clean air
will be permanently out of reach without measures to curb
traffic growth, or that good visibility in national parks may
depend on restricting urban sprawl in their vicinity.
Strong and somewhat absolute goals, like the NAAQS,
can serve to raise to public attention costs of environmental
protection that politicians and advocates would be tempted to
suppress if the regulatory framework allowed it. If the
NAAQS cannot be achieved without restricting traffic, then
the establishment of that NAAQS will give the question of
traffic restrictions a permanent place on the public agenda.
In order for agenda-setting to be effective, it may, once again,
be advisable that the legislative framework should give costs
a subordinate role. Restricting traffic in a city to achieve air
quality standards may well pass a strict economist's cost/benefit test. Indeed, the regulated might save money from the
restrictions. But no statutory cost/benefit test I know of restricts, or should restrict, its definition of "costs" so narrowly.
If EPA were allowed to base its NAAQS decisions on a more
broadly defined cost/benefit test, it would be empowered, and
thus tempted, to use that discretion to avoid setting standards with politically inconvenient and socially disruptive
consequences.
26. To pick the most notable example, while the 1970 Clean Air Act commanded the attainment of all NAAQS nationwide within three to five years, the
1990 Amendments allow up to twenty years for attainment. See Clean Air Act,
Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (Amended 1970); Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No.
101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (Amended 1990); § 181(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7511(a)(1).
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Let me stress that I am not saying that in an ideal world,
EPA would set absolute air quality goals and everyone else
would fall into line. As I said before, in a world with many
voices and many ways to avoid unpleasant issues, the establishment of an absolute standard may be the best way for
EPA to start the debate on whether and how much our society should invest in change to attain it.
B.

Problems With the NAAQS System
1.

Excessive Cost

Although our NAAQS provisions may stimulate debate
on public policy and encourage technical and social innovation, they do so precisely by imposing such heavy burdens on
people that they compel debate and force innovation. Isn't
that a lot to pay to start a conversation? We might well agree
that absolute standards have their benefits, while contending
that those benefits are outweighed by the attendant burdens.
Indeed, the way our political system operates makes
such an unfavorable cost/benefit result likely. Under our
political system, whoever is on top at the moment tends to
push their advantage for all it is worth. The focus on almost
total health protection under the short-term deadlines originally embodied in the CAA stands as one example of how the
environmentalists have played that card. 27 That approach
was meant to convince the industrial community that pollution control needed to be taken seriously, and to create a position that would be hard to change in the light of any future
reversal or moderation of political opinion. Whether it led to
rational investment in innovative new technology, or rational
consideration of social change, are different questions.
However, if reasonably absolute goals are defensible, as I
largely claim, then the way to mitigate their costs is by making the actions mandated to attain them less burdensome.
The CAA has already moved a long way in that direction from
the three to five year deadlines backed up by gasoline rationing of the 1970 statute, 28 to the up to twenty year deadlines
27. See CAA § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1).
28. See Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (Amended 1970).
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with much weaker federal default powers of the 1990 amendments. 2 9 Our implementation framework is probably still not
as long term as it should be. Certainly, it is not long term
enough to reflect the time it will actually take to attain the
standards.
But, on the other hand, we cannot simply set generic decades-long attainment deadlines and leave it at that. Instead,
both rational technology-forcing and encouraging social
change will depend on making the moderate burdens implicit
in such a long-term approach as believable as, or ideally,
more believable than the heavy short-term burdens required
(but often never implemented) under the 1970 amend30
ments.
Absent some crisis, a technology-forcing goal will be far
better pursued with moderate means applied consistently
over time than with short-term crash programs. As we look to
such environmental problems of the future as global climate
change, the ability to generate a moderate, sustained, and believable pressure for investment in environmentally benign
new technologies will become even more important than in
the past.
Similarly, any change in basic social patterns in this free
country will require that citizens themselves voluntarily
change their minds. A regulatory structure that continually
emphasized the importance of the goal that requires those
changes, while leaving citizens themselves free to make
them, would be far more likely to succeed in the long run
than any attempt to compel a change of heart.
2.

Granting EPA Too Much Discretion

How can we make the NAAQS program both more costeffective and sounder in policy without sacrificing the advantages of a relatively absolute decision-making framework? I
29. See Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (Amended 1990).
30. Although the courts upheld the legality of control provisions that could
have required up to a 90% reduction in motor vehicle fuel supply in order to
attain the standards, the provisions were never implemented. See City of Santa
Rosa v. EPA, 534 F.2d. 150 (9th Cir. 1976).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss1/2
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think a slight shift in the currently accepted decision-making
criteria would help move us in that direction.
Let me suggest that the most serious objection to the currently accepted NAAQS framework is that at least until now,
it has given EPA essentially unconfined discretion to pick any
number within a very wide range and make it legally binding
on the whole country as a NAAQS. 3 1 Such discretion, in
which issues receive different treatment for no publicly discernible reason, tends to undermine the virtues of the
NAAQS approach in promoting the public dialogue and technical and social change that I have praised above.
The scientific review process that Congress has required 3 2 does not restrict that unaccountable discretion as
much as you might think. EPA probably could not set a numerical NAAQS limit that CASAC, as an institution, had affirmatively rejected. That provides an important protection
against decisions that are simply scientifically wrong. I gave
full credit to that important "design principle" earlier.
But CASAC typically approves a broad range of standards of widely varying health, welfare, and economic significance for presentation to the Administrator. All of the
standards, in CASAC's view, would be scientifically acceptable. Beyond that, EPA claims the right to set standards that
do not enjoy the institutional support of CASAC, and has
done so, in my opinion, in the case of its PM2.5 standard.
When EPA operates in this range, neither the law nor
any rational argument places any effective limits on its discretion to choose among the many possible standards that
CASAC has either endorsed or not rejected.
The lowest point on the CASAC approved range would be
one logical alternative, but EPA has long since rejected any
such decision rule as both impractical and so politically unwise as to put the NAAQS framework itself in jeopardy. Nor
is the concept of "safety" a reliable harbor in itself. The
Supreme Court has cautioned that the words "safe" or
"safety," as used in a regulatory statute like the CAA, gener31. See 42 U.S.C. § 7408.
32. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7409(d).
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ally do not mean "risk free," but instead must be interpreted
in the light of the risks that are generally considered acceptable "in the world in which we live."3 3 Since the Court also said
that driving a car was generally considered "safe,"34 although
the risks we run when we drive are orders of magnitude
above those that result from most pollutant exposures, this
formulation does nothing to guide the agency's decisions. In
fact, the Court gave "breathing city air" as another example
35
of a "safe" activity.
In the normal world, when we must make a decision
based on uncertain data, we try to look at that decision from
as many different angles as possible, in the hope that one angle will give us the clue to a sensible choice even if the others
do not. And it often does. However, over the past twenty-five
years, EPA has systematically rejected any such right to use
practical tools, holding that the costs of a standard, 3 6 or our
technical ability to implement it, or the disruption it may
cause to existing regulatory systems, or the damage to health
it may cause by increasing unemployment, or by reducing our
shield against other environmental dangers like ultraviolet
light, are all "totally foreign" both to the task of establishing
the basis "health protective" NAAQS itself and to the establishment of a "margin of safety." 3 7 Although this position has
increasingly established itself with time, nothing in the text
or legislative history of the CAA originally required it. The
result has been a system in which the factors on which the
decision is ostensibly based cannot explain the decision.
In my own view, EPA has not always resisted the temptation that such a matrix inevitably presents to tailor its
NAAQS conclusions, within the broad limits of CASAC's failure to disapprove, more to political expediency than to any
33. See Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
34. See id. at 642.
35. See id.
36. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Admin., 902 F.2d 962, 972-73
(D.C. Cir. 1990); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148-51 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
37. See generally, National Ambient Air Quality Control Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652, 38,683-38,689; 38,878-38,883 (1997)
(EPA's discussion of these matters in the final particulate rulemaking).
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view of the merits that exhibits consistency from NAAQS to
NAAQS. The most dramatic illustration of such yielding is
EPA's almost universal failure to set secondary NAAQS
tighter than primary NAAQS.38 Nothing in the statutory
tests prescribes different decision rules for secondary versus
primary standards. 39 It seems clear, from common experience, that the welfare effects of air pollution are at least as
widespread and obvious as the health effects and that the impacts of pollution in decreasing visibility or damaging plants
and streams are at least as noticeable as its impact on health.
Against that background, EPA's relative inaction on welfare
effects requires some explanation. One might suggest that
EPA has been more reluctant to follow the strict letter of the
law to set welfare-protective NAAQS than it has been to set
health-protective NAAQS out of a concern that a strict secondary NAAQS that clearly did not consider practical factors
might trigger a debate that would endanger the NAAQS
framework itself. Since that framework serves primarily to
expand EPA's unreviewable discretion, it confers an entitlement on the regulators that we might expect they would be
reluctant to put at risk. So, it seems, they have.
In the field of health based standards, the very size of the
issues has tended to insulate the agency's decisions from review. When the agency sets a tight standard, it could defend
it by pointing to the public health benefits, the only statutorily relevant factor. When it set a more lenient standard, or
declined to regulate, it could rely on the dictum that "safe"
does not mean risk free, and put the court in the uncomfortable position of requiring the agency to regulate both more
tightly than it wanted to and more tightly than most people
who balanced all the issues in a real-world way might think
justified.
Until 1997, that strategy, if it was a strategy, worked to
perfection. Even though the D.C. Circuit has now, for the first
time, required EPA to explain why a stricter NAAQS than
38. See id.
39. NAAQS for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856, 38,876 (1997) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 50).
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the agency had set was not justified, 40 that decision, as was to
be expected, only took the form of a remand for further explanation.4 1 Given the complexity of most NAAQS records and
the ability to view them in more than one light, it is much too
early to say that the discretion EPA enjoys under the present
NAAQS regime has been materially undermined.
III.

A Final Suggestion

In short, I think that there is much to be said for the
current CAA approach that places the focus of standard-setting primarily on protection against adverse health effects. It
encourages public debate, and can encourage both technical
innovation and at least the consideration of more basic
changes in our collective habits, although all this comes at a
considerable cost. But I believe that we can preserve these
benefits while at the same time narrowing the discretion that
the current decision rules afford the agency, a discretion so
wide as to at least present the danger of abuse.
42
The approach I recommend has been suggested before,
but that is not an objection to it. Under this approach, EPA
would be required to set NAAQS tight enough to protect
against all clearly demonstrated health or welfare effects.
However, in evaluating ambiguous data, and (what may be
the same thing) in setting a "margin of safety," EPA would be
allowed to consider costs and technical feasibility. If that
door were opened, probably the most important new factor
that would come into play would not be the burden to industry as such. Indeed, it would be the balance between acting
now on imperfect data, with the risk of making a mistake, as
opposed to waiting until research clarified the issues, with
the opposite risk of foregoing the benefits of early action. A
change in the decision-making matrix that made that question expressly relevant to EPA standard-setting seems like a
good idea to me.
40. See American Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
41. See id. at 393.
42. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
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Let me close by saying that I am not sure that EPA
would have reached a different decision on its most recent
NAAQS revisions under this approach, although a number of
litigants, including my clients, are urging the adoption of
such an approach in litigation.4 3 From our perspective, the
real chance that the agency might have reached a different
result is enough. From the perspective of this conference, the
question is whether such a relatively modest change in the
decision making matrix represents a change worth making.

43. The major thrust of the challenge to the PM 2.5 NAAQS involves a completely different issue, namely EPA's asserted failure to make critical data concerning the evaluation of the health effects of PM 2.5 available to commentators.
See, e.g., George D. Thurston, Mandating the Release of Health Research Data:
Issues and Implications, 11 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 331 (1998).
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